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In a world of financial globalisation, foreign
investors benefit from bank bailouts in response
to a crisis. Research by Friederike Niepmann
and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr explores the
incentives for governments to act in these
circumstances – and the role of international
cooperation over financial regulation and crisis
management.
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S
evere financial crises followed
by costly government
interventions are not a new
phenomenon. Indeed, in the
last 30 years, financial crises have occurred
frequently: one study counts 117 systemic
banking crises in 93 countries between
the late 1970s and the early 2000s (Caprio
and Klingebiel, 2003). And the costs to
the public purse are usually considerable:
on average, governments spend 12.8% 
of their country’s GDP on interventions 
to restore financial stability (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009, and Honohan and
Klingebiel, 2000). 
Compared with the more regulated
era following the Great Depression, the
new feature of crises today is that they are
rarely local and often involve banks and
consumers worldwide. Two aspects of
financial globalisation have been driving
this. First, the balance sheets of financial
institutions have become increasingly
linked internationally. As a result, a crisis
can spread rapidly from the financial
sector of one country to other countries –
a phenomenon known as ‘contagion’.
Second, there has been a steep rise in
cross-border banking. In a world of global
finance, investors from many different
countries are directly affected when a
bank is in distress. This poses new
challenges for policy-makers responding to
financial crises. Their decisions have effects
both at home and abroad. At the same
time, domestic economic outcomes often
depend on interventions by foreign
governments. 
The recent financial crisis has shown
how this international dimension to policy
interventions can lead to conflicts of
interest between countries. One
prominent example is the bailout of AIG,
an American insurance company with
significant global business, which received
large-scale support from the US
government in September 2008.
The AIG intervention, the cost of
which will eventually accrue to US
taxpayers, benefitted foreign financial
institutions substantially. The asymmetry
between those who paid for the
intervention and those who gained from 
it caused much political debate in the
United States.
Another example is the Icelandic bank
Icesave, in which many UK and Dutch
consumers had invested their savings.
When the bank went bankrupt in 
2008, the Icelandic government did not
compensate all creditors, but only
absorbed the losses of its own nationals.
This caused a severe political confrontation
between the UK, the Netherlands 
and Iceland, culminating in the UK
government’s application of the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act to
freeze Icelandic assets in the UK.
In our research, we formally study the
problems that arise when banks operate
across borders while government
intervention is still limited by national
borders. We are interested in how
governments should deal with banks in
distress when their potential bankruptcy
affects depositors from different countries
and international balance sheet
connections can lead to cross-border
contagion.
If governments do not cooperate
when dealing with an international crisis
but instead behave strategically, this can
lead to decisions that are ‘sub-optimal’
from a global perspective. Different
institutional arrangements that allow
governments to cooperate within well
specified rules could address this concern
and improve global crisis management.
Much research has been conducted on
financial crises and interventions that are
contained within one country, whereas the
international aspects of crises and
interventions have received far less
attention. Two studies have made the case
that cooperation between governments
can be beneficial when financial stability is
a public good that is shared across
countries (Freixas, 2003, and Goodhart
and Schoenmaker, 2009).
Until now, there has been no analysis
that explicitly considers the effects of
international financial linkages on
governments’ incentives to intervene, and
which derives the costs and benefits of a
bailout from the fundamentals of a
country’s economy. Our research provides
a first step to filling this gap. 
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to support a domestic bank in distress
with taxpayer funds, it has to strike the
right balance between creating distortions
in taxation, containing losses from forced
liquidation of bank assets and limiting
financial penalties for depositors and
resulting income inequalities. From a
global perspective, the optimal decision
requires taking account of additional
considerations: contagion effects across
borders, losses incurred by depositors
worldwide as well as the costs to
taxpayers in different countries from
financing bailouts.
Governments care predominantly
about the wellbeing of their own citizens.
When they deal with a financial crisis on
their own without cooperating with other
governments, crisis management can be
sub-optimal for three reasons:
  First, policy-makers do not take
account of the positive effects of their
actions on the wellbeing of foreign
nationals.
  Second, a country may behave
opportunistically: anticipating another
country’s intervention, it may decide not
to act itself and thereby spare its
taxpayers.
  Third, governments typically do not
split the costs of bailouts.
By taking a closer look at events in the
recent crisis, we can learn about the
relevance of these three sources of
inefficiency. For example, in September
2008, the US treasury decided against a
bailout of Lehman Brothers. This triggered
worldwide financial distress and
governments in many countries eventually
gave failing financial institutions within
their jurisdictions large financial support. 
If there had been stronger incentives for
the US government to take account of
these cross-border effects, it might have
been more inclined to decide in favour of
a bailout.
Shortly after Lehman's bankruptcy, the
US Federal Reserve supported AIG.
Without this measure, several foreign
financial institutions would probably have
suffered severe losses, which might have
made government intervention in other
countries necessary. While financial
contributions by other countries were
taken into consideration, ultimately no
overseas governments helped to finance
the AIG bailout. Our analysis suggests
that, anticipating that the US government
would support AIG anyway, other
countries were ‘free-riding’ on the bailout.
In the case of Icesave, the cost of
providing deposit insurance to all
depositors would have been very high for
the relatively small Icelandic population
given the large size of liabilities.
Compensating all depositors by sharing
the costs between the UK, the
Netherlands and Iceland was not
considered an option.
When is cooperation between
governments especially important?
Increased interbank linkages make
cooperation more important as they
increase the extent of cross-border
contagion. Yet internationalisation in
another dimension can reduce the need
for more cooperation: if consumers
deposit more of their funds abroad,
governments start to care about the
health of foreign banks too.
As a consequence of the recent crisis,
there is a worldwide debate on how to
improve global crisis management. Our
research contributes to this debate by
studying different cooperation regimes
and analysing which countries gain or lose
from them. Political efforts to improve
international cooperation have led to the
creation of some new institutions, which
roughly correspond to the ones that we
consider. 
For example, the members of the
Nordic-Baltic Stability Group, created in
August 2010, have agreed to share not
only information but also the costs of
intervention in the event of a future crisis.
The group corresponds to what we call a
central authority with fiscal power. It can
decide whether a bailout of a bank in
distress is undertaken and how the
resulting costs are shared between
countries.
Our analysis shows that with such an
arrangement, there is no guarantee that at
least one country gains from cooperation
while no country loses. This may limit the
willingness of countries to stick to the
agreement when a crisis actually happens.
Another example is the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), a European
Union institution recently established with
the task (among other things) of issuing
recommendations on how to deal with
banks in distress. So far, the ESRB only has
reputational power. Our analysis may help
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prescribe a bailout, which then has to be
financed by one country alone, always
makes that country worse off compared
with a situation where decisions are 
taken unilaterally. 
The willingness of policy-makers to
agree in advance on institutions for crisis
management and sharing rules for the
costs of future interventions is also limited
because of concerns related to ‘moral
hazard’. It is widely agreed that implicit
bailout guarantees – that is, expectations
among some banks and investors that
they will be bailed out if the worst comes
to the worst – led to excessive risk-taking
in the run-up to the recent crisis. Explicit
guarantees could worsen this problem in
the future. 
As an alternative to formal
cooperation, structural reforms of the
financial and banking system are being
discussed so as to avoid international
conflicts in the first place. Restricting the
cross-border operations of banks may help
to reduce the risk of international
contagion. It may also counteract the
divergence between which national
authorities have the power to intervene in
case of distress and which country’s
citizens have the major stake in the
institution concerned. Yet regulations have
other costs, such as limiting risk-sharing
between countries and reducing
international competition among financial
institutions.
Financial reform will continue over the
next few years. Finding the right balance
between the efficiency gains from financial
globalisation, the preservation of national
sovereignty and optimal cooperation when
managing a crisis will remain a challenging
task for policy-makers worldwide.
This article summarises ‘Bank Bailouts,
International Linkages and Cooperation’ by
Friederike Niepmann and Tim Schmidt-
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The key is to find the right balance
between financial globalisation,
national sovereignty and optimal
cooperation in crisis management